

PHILANTHROPY ADVISORS



EVALUATION REPORT 2018



CARE BANGLADESH PROJECT -
BUILDING RESILIENCE OF THE URBAN POOR

COMMISSIONED BY

C&A Foundation

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Commissioned by C&A Foundation
Prepared by Philanthropy Advisors

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April 2018

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The consultants wish to thank the numerous individuals and organizations who participated in this evaluation. We would firstly like to thank the C&A Foundation team (Lee Risby and Savi Mull) for their guidance and support ahead of the field evaluation. We are particularly grateful to the CARE Bangladesh BRUP team (Mamunur Rashid, Biswojit Kumar Roy, Tamana Sadaka, Palash Mondal) for their comprehensive effort in sharing their insights and overview of the evolution of the project and for organizing excellent logistical support. We would also like to thank the institutional respondents (from the Gazipur City Corporation, the Fire Service and Civil Defense, and the Ward 12 Councillor), as well as community members in Tongi and Konabari, for participating in diverse Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) or interviews and taking some time from their busy schedules. Finally we would like to thank the CARE Bangladesh staff who gave the evaluation team a very warm welcome. They patiently answered our queries and made themselves available, actively participating in meetings and discussions (Sazidur Rahman, Arshad Muhammad, Abu Taher, Mehrul Islam) to help us grasp the core lessons from the project.



List of Acronyms

BRUP Building Resilience of the Urban Poor
CCDMC City Corporation Disaster Management Committee
CDC Community Development Committee
CBO CARE Bangladesh Office
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
EKATA Empowerment Knowledge and Transformative Action
FGD Focus Group Discussion
FSCD Fire Service and Civil Defence
GCC Gazipur City Corporation
GoB Government of Bangladesh
KII Key Informant Interview
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
RMG Ready-Made Garments
RRAP Risk Reduction Action Plan
SOD Standing Orders for Disaster
TFD Theatre For Development
ToC Theory of Change
UCV Urban Community Volunteer
VERC Village Education Resource Centre
WDMC Ward Disaster Management Committee

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1. Executive Summary

The ‘*Building Resilience of the Urban Poor*’ (BRUP) initiative was a three-year urban resilience project led by CARE Bangladesh and its local partner Village Education Resource Centre (VERC), funded by C&A Foundation and contracted via CARE USA. The project began in November 2014 and aimed to enhance resilience within six targeted urban communities and three targeted institutions in Gazipur City Corporation (GCC). The C&A Foundation requested that an independent evaluation of the project be undertaken to provide an objective assessment of successes, failures and missed opportunities.

This evaluation was commissioned primarily as a learning exercise, being additional and complementary to a separate endline evaluation study conducted by a local consulting firm which will document the project’s results in a more quantitative way. Most of our findings concur with the endline evaluation study, especially on effectiveness, sustainability and efficiency. Our findings, lessons and recommendations concentrate on a programme/strategic level, while the endline study concentrated mostly on assessing the performance at a project/activities level.

The overarching objective of this evaluation was to extract the main lessons learned from the BRUP project, in order to ensure that best practices are incorporated in the potential scale-up or replication of such an intervention in similar settings.

The evaluation of the BRUP project was undertaken using a qualitative approach, collecting and analysing a compilation of primary and secondary data to assess the effectiveness, relevance, sustainability and efficiency of the project.

1.1 Key Findings

The evaluators find that, overall, the project has achieved a good level of success, particularly in terms of relevance and effectiveness. Sustainability and efficiency are found to be weaker points. The BRUP model and ToC is valid and highly relevant for this challenging urban context. During its three years, the project has generated many lessons and best practices in urban settings and has received a great deal of attention from the CARE country office, as well as from the Gazipur City Corporation (GCC) authorities, while benefiting from national and even international visibility. If the model is to be scaled-up, some changes should be made at strategic, programmatic and activities levels, as detailed in the recommendations.

Relevance (Good)

The choice of Gazipur City Corporation (GCC) for this pilot project, a new city corporation in Bangladesh, is judged to be strategically astute for CARE Bangladesh, considering the growing importance of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in urban contexts and the knowledge

gaps which exist in this arena, and thus the possibility for CARE to become a key player in the area of urban resilience (relevant also to CARE's strategic objectives for 2020).

The BRUP project's Theory of Change (ToC) set out a process whereby through enhancing household and community resilience, empowering women and strengthening institutional resilience, the overall resilience of vulnerable communities could be improved. The institutional and governance approach is found to be both relevant and effective, as the institutional level work is amplifying/ sustaining the impact achieved at community level. The community-based approach in GCC, whilst challenging to implement, was valid and proved that, as in rural communities, it is still possible to rely on communities in urban fragmented settings to self-manage large components of resilience programmes.

However, a major opportunity was missed by not engaging with the private sector from the beginning to work on resilience and risk reduction. Knowing the central place of the garment industry in Gazipur, private sector engagement could have increased project efficiency and impact by bringing in new channels of funding and by improving work conditions and resilience within workplaces, and not only at the household level.

Effectiveness (Good)

The project objectives, as per the logframe, have been fulfilled and the project even surpassed its objectives in many areas, covering more beneficiaries than expected. The evaluation finds sufficient indicators to show, at least in the communities visited, that the awareness of fire risks and response capacities of communities have increased and that implementation of the project has been positive for the communities in this regard. In terms of women as a force for urban resilience, there was evidence to demonstrate a shifting of attitudes regarding women playing an active role in DRR and in the community. The institutional component was particularly successful, as it encouraged strong ties between the Community Development Committees (CDCs) and Ward Disaster Management Committees (WDMCs). The project has included many advocacy successes, as DRR strategies have been embedded into the City Corporation Disaster Management Committee (CCDMC), WDMCs were recently approved as part of the national SODs (Standing Order on Disasters) and GCC has replicated the WDMC model in all 57 of its wards.

The achievements beyond project boundaries were enabled thanks to the pilot approach which meant project flexibility was built into the design. International support and strong learning and knowledge management were also key enabling factors.

Some unexpected outcomes, such as the fostering of social coherence and a 'sense of community' amongst residents, can be considered a key 'resilience' achievement attributable to the project.

Key challenges to project effectiveness were numerous, such as the differences between working with Kash land and private land (where 'hardware' provision was limited), as well as political issues at the GCC governance level, on which the project was dependent.

Sustainability (Poor to Adequate)

Although sustainability was built into the ToC and some elements such as attitude changes and institutional embedding of DRR are likely to be long lasting, sustainability remains a key area for concern. Sustainability of the project's gains has been severely impeded by the absence of a proper exit strategy and the loss of organisational memory that will occur from staff turnover at the end of the project. The sustainability of a project of this type is compromised by being highly dependent on political will and a lack of available public resources additionally creates dependency on INGOs. Finally, the sustainability of the community's participation is weakened by the fact no future community leader has been identified, no future training for Urban Community Volunteers (UCVs) has been provided for and meeting spaces have closed.

Efficiency (Poor to Adequate)

In a way, the project could be considered to be adequately efficient when taking into account that it was a pilot and that a significant part of the budget was thus allocated to M&E, learning and knowledge management purposes. The project was also particularly efficient when we consider that some project features were replicated elsewhere at no cost.

However, the evaluators noted that a very high percentage of the budget was allocated to staff salaries and also that there was a fair amount of duplication of roles between CARE Bangladesh and its partner VERC, which undermined efficiency. Increased integration with other actors and CARE Bangladesh projects in the region of intervention could have perhaps helped to reduce costs. Moreover, if we consider only the beneficiaries reached by the project compared to the total budget and financial resources used, the efficiency of the project is seen to be poor.

Likelihood of Impact (No Rating)

Assessing the BRUP project performance at output level was quite straightforward, but assessing the impact (at outcome level, e.g. SG1 "building resilience of communities") is much more difficult. Impact is not something that can be measured in such a short-term period, and resilience building is a complex concept, touching on multiple aspects of DRR, development and governance. This is why the evaluators refer to 'likelihood of impact' rather than 'impact'.

Some structural changes are assumed to have a likelihood of impact, such as the formation of 'water collectives' which have increased access to safe water, and actually changed the market dynamics. However, other underlying and structural factors of vulnerability remain, such as poverty-driven risky behaviours or the lack of tenure security impeding any investments and future prospects.

The main likelihood of impact of the project is probably to be found in its trigger role in creating awareness and its possible contribution to future programming in urban resilience issues in Bangladesh.

1.2 Key Lessons Learned

Many lessons learned have been gathered by the BRUP team during the project's lifetime and compiled in the different BRUP's progress reports. The purpose of this section is not to present an exhaustive list of all of them, but rather to highlight the main lessons learned from this evaluation.

1. **Systematic engagement of the private sector is key to building urban resilience, but would require a longer-term approach, as building cooperative agreements with the private sector takes time.** Intervening in GCC requires engaging and dealing with a multitude of local stakeholders because of the urban systems connections, but also because of the proximity of many actors with different interests and needs. Since there is a clear paucity of funding in GCC to invest in slum areas, **alternative sources of funding through private sector engagement (and particularly with the large garments corporations)** is a way to channel and enable funding for tackling urban vulnerabilities on a medium to long term basis. As part of the strategic role of the private sector in urban resilience, there is also the necessity to **involve the surrounding factories to embed DRR at workplaces** and to improve work conditions.
2. **Despite the challenges, community-driven initiatives are effective in urban areas to manage large component of resilience programme.** Rural and urban settlements offer different challenges regarding the planning and the implementation of development activities. Issues that come into play in urban areas, such as the political economy, the institutional fragmentation, and increased socio-cultural diversity, makes the DRR “community-based approach” more complex in urban settings compared to rural areas. However, this project has shown that with the right tools and approaches, community-driven DRR initiatives (such as waste management, water collectives, etc.) are efficient in urban fragmented settings, as they bring social cohesion benefits to the community by increasing dwellers involvement in different activities. Also, we learned that the success of community-based initiatives in urban informal settlements depends on:
 - a. **The existence of a “safe space”** and a facilitator to enable the community to gather and sustain community life
 - b. **The link of urban communities with the relevant local governments institutions** and the set-up of a comprehensive planning and cooperation between them

- c. **The need for constant lobbying and advocacy toward higher-up city institutions** (GCC), critical for the success of community-driven activities.
 - d. **The need to have substantial community financial contribution, as well as a community-driven financial plan** to sustain and manage the hardware/infrastructure activities and resilience/DRR investments in-community.
3. **In urban areas, the political situation highly influences the feasibility and sustainability of the project.** The GCC council is the key decision-making body when it comes to resources allocation, and therefore elected representatives have a lot of influence on the impact and scale-up of the project, as well as its viability and sustainability. The GCC experiences a high turnover of elected senior officials, because of changes in power and within political parties, limiting the follow-through on projects. This also results in an inconsistent policy outlook as regulations change with governments, adding to delays in obtaining permissions and registrations.
 4. **Land ownership issues in urban, informal settlements influence to a great extent the effectiveness of a resilience building project.** The effectiveness of BRUP project activities has seen different levels of achievement depending on the tenure settings (private land vs. Kash land). Indeed, the locations on Kash land have seen good progress towards project goals and the those located on private land have been more challenging. Working and engaging with private landlords (on private land) is found to be more challenging that working on Kash land, due to privacy and conflict of interest concerns with the landlords.
 5. **Having formalised partnerships with local institutions is key for the ownership and involvement of institutional stakeholders.** Formal partnerships with institutions are useful for smooth and effective execution of project intervention.

1.3 Recommendations

Recommendations below are aimed at C&A Foundation and CARE Bangladesh to enhance and refine the intervention strategy and create systemic change on the issue of urban resilience building. Here are presented and summarized the most important recommendations. More detailed contributory recommendations can be found page 35 of this report.

Nb. Strategic recommendations should also be considered by the CARE network for its strategic positioning on urban resilience programming.

Strategic Recommendations for C&A Foundation:

The C&A Foundation should:

1. **Sustain and scale-up the effort to build an urban resilience strategy and response in Bangladesh, while maintaining the focus on Gazipur City Corporation**, to capitalise on and sustain project gains but also because of its strategic role in Bangladesh's economy.
2. **Engage the local, and booming, private sector** in terms of resources, interests and expertise to co-design or co-fund any similar future interventions. **To achieve private actors, buy-in and engagement, C&A Foundation should support longer term approach and programmes** aiming at building resilience in urban settings (on a 5-year cycle).
3. **Pursue the evidence-based learning and dissemination exercise** initiated by the BRUP pilot project, In the future, research and baseline assessments of such projects should concentrate on understanding the drivers and inhibitors to private sector participation.

Programmatic Recommendations for CARE Bangladesh:

CARE Bangladesh should:

1. **Define a more comprehensive approach to vulnerability and risk reduction for urban resilience** (addressing compound risks like health, climate and seasonal risks, fire safety etc.), especially by engaging from the beginning local factories to build resilience at workplace and improve work conditions.
2. **Build synergies and better inter-link CARE Bangladesh's projects in a defined geographic zone (geographic urban focus)**. For better coordination between

service providers in GCC, CARE Bangladesh should set up and lead a formal NGOs coordination platform in Gazipur City Corporation.

3. **Better differentiate and organise the roles of CARE Bangladesh and the implementing partner** VERC, based on the added value of each to increase efficiency and enable the replication of such pilot project.
4. **Rethink and tailor its intervention strategy according to the land tenure** aspect of the area of intervention.
5. **Consider entrepreneurship from community members as a possible solution for basic last mile service delivery in urban settings.**

2. Introduction

2.1 Purpose of the Evaluation

A learning-oriented evaluation

The primary purpose of this final evaluation was to extract the main lessons learned from the Building Urban Resilience of the Urban Poor (BRUP) project, in order to ensure that best practices are incorporated in the potential scale-up or replication of such interventions aiming at building resilience in fragile urban settings. The evaluation has both an accountability and learning purpose. However, as the learning component was a central objective for the evaluators, the team has mostly focused on challenges, strengths and weaknesses, missed opportunities, and factors of success to provide some programmatic and strategic recommendations in order to improve future programming on urban resilience in such a context. This evaluation is additional and complementary to the CARE-commissioned endline evaluation conducted by DevResonance Ltd., which will document in a more quantitative way the changes and progress made towards the initial project's objectives (see outputs and outcomes indicators in BRUP's logframe in Annex 3). The results of the evaluation should enable CARE to refine the Theory of Change (ToC) and make programme adjustments for follow-on initiatives.

Specific objectives of the evaluation

- To examine the project performance during the period of implementation (October 2014 to February 2018) according to the OECD DAC criteria: relevance, sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency of the project;
- To understand the likelihood of impact of the project e.g. the overall contribution of the project to urban resilience and disaster risk reduction in Gazipur;
- To identify lessons learned and best practices (what works and what doesn't, where were the missed opportunities) of the BRUP project, and provide recommendations to improve further similar programme development within CARE (Bangladesh) and the CARE network.

Evaluation Questions and Evaluation Matrix

The evaluation was designed around four key questions related to the areas of relevance, sustainability, effectiveness, and efficiency. More detailed sub-questions are available in the Evaluation Matrix developed by PA in Annex 1.

Criteria	Main Evaluation Questions
<i>Relevance</i>	How relevant was the project to the communities' needs and other stakeholders it sought to support?
<i>Sustainability</i>	To what extent has DRR been embedded into local structures and how likely is it that activities will continue in the medium and long term?
<i>Effectiveness</i>	To what extent did the project meet its objectives in building beneficiaries'/partners' capacities and resilience to disaster?
<i>Efficiency</i>	To what extent have the project design and management mechanisms supported the implementation?

2.2 Evaluation Methodology

A qualitative approach

The evaluation of the BRUP project was undertaken using **a qualitative approach**, beneficial in providing rich project feedback and enabling flexibility for data collection in the field. The team collected and analysed a compilation of primary and secondary data, reviewing available project documentation (around 30 documents), and conducting field observation, Key Informant Interviews (KIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with the main project stakeholders, beneficiaries and other identified respondents in Dhaka and Gazipur City Corporation (GCC). The evaluators worked hand in hand with the project staff, and provided regular findings feedback to the BRUP team, thus facilitating a continuous learning loop. At the beginning of the field mission, a first workshop with the BRUP team enabled the evaluation team to gain an understanding of the project's history, achievements, and main challenges. This helped to highlight key issues from the beginning of the process, and to focus the evaluation on the issues of concern to the field staff. At the end of the mission, a debriefing meeting, where project staff and top management from CARE Bangladesh were in attendance, was organised to present the preliminary findings. This ensured a common understanding of the challenges, room for debate on strategy and how change might be best achieved as well as the facilitation of group based validation.

Data collection and procurement plan

The evaluators and BRUP project team worked on a field trip itinerary in order to cover a maximum of project stakeholders and to visit the most important or relevant project sites for the purpose of the evaluation (depending on access and availability of respondents). For field data collection, the time in-country was limited due the presence of BRUP team only until the 28th of February, so the evaluators were not able to visit all 6 communities, and are aware of the bias this could create in the evaluation findings.

The data procurement plan is available in Annex 2, for more details on sources and respondents. Two out of the six target communities (Uttor Tetultola in Tongi and Baimail Nodirpar in Konabari) were selected to conduct KIIs and FGDs activities with community beneficiaries (EKATA Groups, CDC group, Children Forum groups, UCVs group). An additional two communities were visited for observation. In Konabari, the evaluation team visited Baimail Pukurpar, located on private land, in order to understand the differences in project implementation and achievements in the different legal/tenure settings. Indeed, the locations on public land have seen good progress towards project goals and the ones located on private land have been more challenging.

A total of 69 people took part in the evaluation across the following groups:

- 49 community beneficiaries (from CDC, EKATA, Children Forum, UCVs, and non-beneficiaries);
- 5 institutional respondents (ward councillor, GCC officials and FSCD representatives);
- 11 CARE Bangladesh staff (BRUP team, top management of Care Bangladesh including Country Director, Deputy Country Director, PEARL Director, and other CARE Bangladesh programme staff)
- 4 CARE Bangladesh partners (VERC focal point, field facilitators and CEO of DevResonance).

The evaluation team and timetable

The team was composed of two evaluators, accompanied by one independent translator when necessary, as well as one project staff for logistic and facilitation support.

The evaluation took place from 29th January to 30th March 2018:

- Evaluation preparation: 29th January to 15th February;
- Primary data collection and fieldwork in Dhaka and GCC: 21st February to 2nd March;
- Analysis, report write up and finalisation: 5th March to 30th March.

3. Context of the Intervention and Project Overview

3.1 Gazipur City Corporation Context

Risk accumulation in a rapid and unplanned urbanisation context

Gazipur City Corporation, incorporated in June 2013, is one of the newest city corporations and one of the largest in terms of area coverage. This city corporation covers 57 wards populated by over 2.5 million people (official figures), and has an official annual growth rate of 5.21%.

The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics estimates that within the Gazipur City Corporation there are approximately 750,000 poor residents, of which 700,000 are living in one of 1,410 slums or informal settlements¹. This official statistic is very likely to be underestimated, as we were told informally by a key respondent at the GCC that the number of inhabitants in GCC could easily reach 3 million, the number of slums could exceed 2,000 in GCC and the number of slum dwellers could be well over 1 million.

As the hub of the readymade garment sector, there is an estimated 844 factories operating within the Gazipur City Corporation. These are both primary factories that take large overseas orders, and secondary factories that are often subcontracted to fulfil parts of these large overseas orders. The presence of the RMG (Ready-Made Garments) sector makes GCC one of the wealthiest city corporations, one of the country's main economic hubs and a pool for internal and seasonal migration. **This also makes it an example of rapid and unplanned urbanisation, where poverty and vulnerability are concentrated, and where disaster risks accumulate, particularly for the poorest population living in informal settlements** (surrounding garments or brick factories for example). Service provisions to the informal settlement communities are poor, with no formal tax revenue raised from these vulnerable populations to cover costs. Most unplanned settlements in the GCC catchment area are located either on private land (freehold or leasehold land) or squatting on government land (Kashland).

A quick comparison between private and public land

Baimail Pukurpar (Konabari) consists of privately-owned land and tenants have access to gas, water, and electricity as provided by their landlords. Fees for these services are typically included in the monthly rent. Conversely, Uttor Tetultola (Tongi) is situated on government-owned land, and most tenants lack legal ownership of their land and face a high risk of eviction. Government services (e.g. electricity, water, gas) are not widely provided².

Increasing vulnerabilities

¹ CARE Bangladesh, July 2014: Urban Socio-Economic and Vulnerability Study of Gazipur City Corporation

² CARE Bangladesh, July 2014: Urban Socio-Economic and Vulnerability Study of Gazipur City Corporation

Based on the socio-economic study conducted prior to the project implementation in 2014, three tiers of vulnerability and risk for the Tongi and Konabari areas (project locations) were identified, which the BRUP project has tried to address:

- Increased vulnerability to **natural and manmade threats**, including environmental pollution (mostly due to improper solid waste management), poor sanitation, lack of safe water, poor building construction, fire, water-logging/flooding and earthquakes.
- **Social risks** that include a growing trend of gender-based violence, increased drug use, and a growing prevalence of gambling, resulting in high debt.
- **Institutional risks**, including a lack of provision of basic services (garbage management, water and sanitation), and poor implementation of legislative provisions related to employment, housing, disaster and fire safety.

3.2 CARE Bangladesh: A Leading Player in Gazipur City Corporation

CARE Bangladesh has been working in Gazipur since 2012, and since then has implemented nine urban-based projects focused on empowering women, strengthening the public sector and improving the provision of health services. CARE has a hub office in Gazipur, currently hosting 3 ongoing projects. These projects work with poor and extremely poor households, including women employed within the RMG sector. CARE Bangladesh is well established in Gazipur, and benefits from its national good reputation as well as good relationship with the GCC, which allows it to act as a leader in the NGO landscape of GCC. With support from the GCC, CARE mobilized other NGOs working in Gazipur and now leads an informal coordination mechanism, enabling better coordination between service providers.

3.3 BRUP Strategy and Theory of Change (TOC)

Project Description

BRUP is a three-year **pilot** project implemented by CARE and its local partner VERC from October 2014 to February 2018 (the project benefited from a 4-month no cost extension) in the newly formed Gazipur City Corporation. It aimed at enhancing the resilience of six targeted urban communities (3 in Konabari and 3 in Tongi areas) and strengthening the capacity of 3 targeted institutions (GCC, Ward 12 and 55, and FSCD) to plan for and provide services that mitigate the impact of manmade and natural disasters on poor and extremely poor households.

The strategic goals of the project are:

- *SG 1 (outcome 1): 8,000 urban individuals (direct 2,000 and indirect 6,000) in six communities have enhanced resilience strategies to prepare for, mitigate, respond to and recover from shocks and stresses.*
- *SG 2 (outcome 2): 300 poor and extremely poor women in the six targeted communities are empowered to become better risk managers at the household and community levels, influencing decision-making related to Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR).*
- *SG 3 (outcome 3): Three targeted institutions have enhanced their capacity and responsiveness to provide services to targeted communities so that they may prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from shocks and stresses. The three targeted institutions are: GCC, WDMC, and FSCD.*

Areas targeted in GCC	Communities
Tongi	Uttor Tetultola Dokkhin Tetultola Medical Community
Konabari	Baimail Nodirpar Baimail Pukurpar (Private land) Baimail Modhopara (Private land)


BRUP: A Strategic Pilot for CARE

The BRUP project has been designed as a pilot, an experiment, providing a valuable opportunity for CARE **to learn and test** its “resilience” theory of change in an urban context. It also provided an opportunity to test and transpose CARE community-based tools (mostly used in rural context, now adapted to urban settings) in a relatively new work environment for the organisation, and even for the CARE network as a whole. Prior to this project, none of the BRUP team members had worked on urban DRR: *“It was new to everybody, even for me, for the partner, for everybody”* (BRUP team member). M&E and knowledge management were made a core component and priority of the project, generating **internal knowledge, lessons and material** on urban resilience.

BRUP’s Theory of Change

The BRUP project has deployed multiple strategies and targeted different levels/systems to enhance urban resilience. BRUP’s approach was to prioritize DRR in governance at all levels. The project addressed household and community level resilience via the creation and

capacity building of different community groups³ on risk awareness, risk mapping and risk reduction (trying to address some permanent risks and needs for basic services such as water, sanitation and drainage and on an ad hoc basis the project also responded to urgent



needs created by shocks). The project also aimed at engaging and strengthening the capacity of key institutions in managing DRR (strengthening the system already in place), and linking the different institutions in charge of DRR (wards, GCC, FSCD) within the targeted communities.

CARE had a leading role in the relationship building and the advocacy towards the authorities given its high profile and credibility, necessary to develop the relationships and networking strategy with the key authorities at GCC level, or even at the ministry level with the Department of Disaster Management (DDM) (under the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief). Overall, the BRUP project did not

concentrate on technical DRR hardware (hardware activities represented a small part of the overall project budget), but more on 'soft' measures such as building community structures and developing the communities' ability to communicate and link with local government (via Risk Reduction Action Plans), which actually was a very strong outcome of the project. Additionally, while the project's overall goal is to increase the resilience of vulnerable communities, project activities have tended to focus more on disaster response and preparedness, with a major focus on resilience to fire risk. Climate change resilience, though mentioned as a goal for the project, was not really present in any component or in any of the project activities.

³ CDC, EKATA, CF

4. Evaluation Main Findings⁴

4.1 Relevance and Appropriateness

Overall rating: Good (See C&A Foundation ranking system in Annex 4)

(++) Urban Focus - The New Frontier of Resilience, DRR and Development Work

Given the rapid, unplanned urbanisation which has occurred in Bangladesh, similar to other developing countries worldwide, manmade and natural disasters have become particularly threatening in built-up and densely populated urban areas, with potentially catastrophic human consequences. The growing number of job opportunities in the district of Dhaka and particularly in Gazipur has resulted in overpopulation, increased poverty and unwanted pollution. These factors place an immense risk on inhabitants, a field poorly addressed by usual DRR and development practitioners.

Crises in urban areas differ greatly from rural contexts and are less well known about, including by the development community who are much less experienced in urban settings (particularly in Bangladesh where development actors are most well-established in rural areas). The development community has thus been forced to fundamentally rethink the way they can prepare for, and respond to, disasters in cities.

Therefore, it is highly relevant for CARE Bangladesh to develop and engage in DRR urban programming in the Gazipur hub, to demonstrate feasibility and test new models in order to become a key player in the area of urban DRR and achieve its strategic objective for 2020 (urban is a key focus for CARE's International Strategy 2020).

(++) A Strategic Pilot in Gazipur City Corporation

Aware of the knowledge gap on urban resilience building, as well as bearing witness to the poor institutional focus in Bangladesh on urban resilience and urban DRR (the Standing Orders on Disaster (SOD); the bill of law organising disaster management in Bangladesh, largely focuses on rural vulnerabilities and response), Care Bangladesh wisely designed a pilot project which aimed at testing and demonstrating intervention strategies as well as raising awareness among stakeholders. In this way, the choice of Gazipur City Corporation is very relevant as, being one of the main economic hubs of the country, it benefits from attention from the GoB and higher international visibility. Similarly, given the high economic interest in the zone and the possible buy-in from the private sector for the issue (global urban resilience can be beneficial to the sustainable interests of the private sector and industry), the choice of Gazipur proved relevant.

Moreover, the project design, comprising of large learning and capitalising components, as well as advocacy and visibility towards partners and institutions, is appropriate for the idea of **testing a methodology and approach**, learning from it and refining it, promoting and

⁴ Evaluators' Ranking system: ++ (Very good) + (Good) - (Weak) -- (Unsatisfactory)

disseminating the findings, and then replicating and scaling it up. The project outcome shows that some approaches and elements have already been incorporated into local law (the WDMC approach being incorporated into the SOD) or replicated at the GCC level (such as community-based waste management).

(++) A Sound Integrated Approach

The approach and project activities are found to be highly relevant to the context of the targeted population in Gazipur City Corporation. Coupled with household/community-based DRR interventions, advocacy towards, and direct support for, key city institutions is essential for a long-term impact on resilience of these vulnerable communities. Indeed, one of the key underlying drivers of disaster risk is poor urban governance. Any project looking at strengthening resilience in urban areas cannot therefore ignore the institutional components.

This integrated approach is found to provide better results as work at the institutional level is framed to support, accompany and sustain the impact achieved at community level.

Involving women as a strategic pillar is found to be highly relevant since they have been key leaders in managing community groups and driving DRR activities in communities, as they can acquire the trust of the rest of the community and are willing to spare some of their time to get involved with community life.

The project approach has been valued and validated by all project stakeholders. Community members and authorities repeatedly requested that the project team provide more support, and the institutional representatives were enthusiastic about the project activities.

The project ToC seems valid, starting from the individual/family level to increase resilience, organising the community for community resilience and engaging at the institutional level for urban resilience, while women's empowerment is used as a tool and a driver for change in that process.

(++) Effective Community-driven Management in a Fragmented Community

If proved to be more challenging in urban fragmented areas (time constraints of the beneficiaries, no sense of a community at project onset, poor social bonding, lack of traditional or formal community leadership), it is still possible with the right tools (information centre, community mobilizer etc.) to apply community-based programming to urban settings. This finding shows the relevance of the ToC, putting community self-identification and management of risks at the heart of the change process. A key lesson from the project is that, as in rural communities, it is still possible to rely on communities in urban fragmented settings to self-manage large components of resilience programmes.

(+) Community-driven Risk Identification

The project was designed based on a thorough understanding of needs and risks within the Konabari and Tongi communities. Several baseline and assessment studies were conducted prior to project implementation, which provided the staff and the communities with a very good understanding of the needs and key vulnerabilities to address.

In addition, the approach consisted of a community mobilisation effort to engage the community in carrying out an analysis of the hazards they face. This was followed by the communities identifying their priorities for action. The hardware activities were designed based on needs identified by the beneficiaries themselves. For example, community members identified fire, flooding, and waterlogging, and poor waste management and sanitation systems as key risks in the community. CDC members very quickly took advantage of the committees' formation and their coordinated approach, and swiftly established functioning garbage management and "water collective"⁵ systems to answer the major concerns of their communities. This bottom-up approach gave early credibility to the project and actually helped to engage the institutions from the outset. The community based needs assessment also ensured project activities and responses were relevant to the actual needs of the community.

(-) Community-based Targeting

Risk of exclusion

Even when a thorough analysis has been performed, if the beneficiaries are selected through community identification, there is always a risk of community selection bias and a risk that certain households will be excluded, especially in fragmented and heterogeneous communities such as the targeted ones. Indeed, no mechanisms ensured that those already excluded from community life (for any social exclusion reasons: disability, ethnicity, language, religion, etc.) and thus, usually the most vulnerable, were included in the targeting. Without any indication that this problem occurred, but also without any formal mechanism to reduce the risk, the evaluators felt the need to highlight this possible bias.

(--) Missed Opportunities for BRUP

Private Sector Engagement in Urban Resilience

Knowing the central place of the garment industry in Gazipur, conscious of its financial weight and its potential interest in urban resilience (for business related reasons), and being aware of the interaction between local authorities and the private sector, the evaluation

⁵ 'The Water Collective' is a community managed women friendly solution co-created by CARE in co-financing mechanism to solve out water scarcity of the slums. The system, where communities have full control, ensured communities access to safe water 24/7 at a cheaper price at their doorsteps.

A group of selective community members voluntarily collects the fees from households to manage operational costs and maintenance. Remaining balance is being deposited in bank. The water collective has formal links with the municipal authority.

team feels that there is a whole area of cooperation that has been underexplored. Indeed, leveraging private sector interest in the efficiency of its workforce as well as image-related issues, linked to corporate social responsibility but also its need for a sustainable environment in which to operate and generate revenue, the private sector could have been engaged on different levels and for different reasons. Cooperation on fire safety, waste management, provision of services and financial means, as well as the potential for adding extra “pressure” on local authorities to take or maintain action, could have been explored. The team tried to engage with some private sector industry actors but at a later stage (for example with the Ha-Meem Group, which funded more than 200 bins and vests for the scale-up of the garbage management system).

Risk Reduction in the Workplace

Project activities have focused on slum dwellers’ homes mostly, whilst inhabitants spend most of their time in a risk environment whilst at their workplaces. One missed opportunity was **to build resilience at workplaces and improve work conditions**, something that has been asked for by CDC (Community Development Committee) members. This would have required a very early engagement strategy with the private sector (garments factory), which was in fact done but at a later stage and on a small scale, ad hoc basis. Working with the private sector on workplace safety would have required a proper strategic goal in the logframe.

“To me this TOC is valid in terms of scope. But you know, we worked a lot at the household place. But in the daytime, people are going to different places, such as the factory, and we didn’t do anything for the resilience at workplace” (BRUP team member)

Reduce Exposure to Fire Hazards

If the project did a lot to improve absorptive capacities (and especially risk coping mechanisms), the project could have done more to reduce underlying risk factors identified in the communities. For example, according to Bangladesh Fire Service and Civil Defence records, faulty electric connection/wiring’ is the main cause for fire incidents in urban areas. **In some slum areas, fire mostly originates from electric short circuit. Very little was done to diminish the likelihood of the occurrence of fire by engaging with (legal or illegal) electricity providers**, despite providers being the ones to set up power lines in the slums. Even if the project did try to reach out to industry owners, this aspect seems like a missed opportunity when it is widely understood that poor electric wiring is one of the major causes of domestic fires in this environment.

“We met with industry owners and we tried to convince them that if they improve their electric connexion, then domestic fires will go down” (BRUP team member)

4.2 Effectiveness

Overall rating: Good

(+) Project Achievements

Effectiveness addresses whether a project or a programme achieves its objective or not. The project objectives, as per the logframe, have been fulfilled and the project even surpassed its objectives in many areas, covering more beneficiaries than expected. BRUP is well rated inside the CARE Bangladesh M&E system (it was given the ‘transformative’ ranking, which actually applies to only 10% of CARE Bangladesh’s projects).

“It was a complex project design. We thought it wouldn’t be possible to reach objectives. But after one year our vision changed. We created a lot of changes and we are very proud”
(BRUP team member)

Most of the respondents felt that some components of the project were particularly successful and effective:

SG1: Urban communities have enhanced resilience strategies

At the household level:

- **(+) Household risk awareness and preparedness:** At the household level, respondents were able to give examples of how their risk awareness and preparedness had increased (particularly on the capacity to cope with fire risk). This component is a key success, and there are multiple evidences of behaviour change at this level (most of the beneficiaries now keep sand bags and water by their cooking stove in case of fire). In the initial vulnerability study, mass awareness of fire risk was limited. This outcome of the project was a major success.
- **(+) Changing the power balance between husband and wife at household level:** Women’s empowerment, particularly through their involvement in decision-making processes, and many other activities at the community level, was a significant outcome of the project. Some feedback indicated that women’s empowerment has also happened at the household level.

“It is a win-win situation. My husband sees potentiality in me participating in this activity (EKATA), as I bring more knowledge on finance management for example in the family. It gave me some convincing power at home, and now I am more listened to” (EKATA member Tongi)

At the community level, respondents were able to give examples of how the community’s capacity to cope and respond to disaster had increased (particularly regarding fire risk). We

identified some critical enablers, in addition to financial/hardware resources provided by the project (for access to water, drainage systems and waste management mechanisms):

- **(++) Community organisation and community-driven initiatives:** this was feasible via the creation of community groups (there was no sense of ‘community’ in those targeted urban settings) and the setup of a safe place in-community to enable group gatherings (the information hub or also called the knowledge information centre). Community-driven initiatives (‘water collective’ and ‘garbage management system’) were enabled thanks to community mobilisation and organisation facilitated by the project.
- **(+) Being linked with the relevant institutions:** (for example the FSCD, the formal banking sector, the ward committee, etc.) to be able to carry out activities in an autonomous way. Participatory community planning is effective if interfaced with multi-level, institutional planning processes.
- **(+) Community response capacity** through the training of Urban Community Volunteers: there was huge appeal for more UCVs in GCC. In response, the project trained UCVs in an additional 15 wards meaning that throughout the project a total of 600 UCVs (31% female) were trained. These UCVs are a real force for the project; they are the ‘*extended arm*’ of the FSCD in the community, and increase the response capacity of the FSCD in hard-to-reach areas. The UCVs were highly proactive and efficient in responding to major fire incidents in different places (e.g. Tampaco fire). In addition, community mock drills have been organised in the surrounding areas covering communities, schools and factories, with the technical assistance of FSCD. They are seen as the best way to prepare for disaster.

“Now I can protect myself, my family and my community and I have skills I can share”
(female UCV, Tongi)

- **(+) Mentality shift in-community:** *“There is a big shift now. Community members are also thinking about the importance of the ‘soft’ activities”* (BRUP team member). People have realised that software interventions, such as training and capacity building, are as important as hardware and financial support. This can also be attributed to the project.

SG2: Women as a Force for Urban Resilience

- **(++) Changing mentalities about the role of women in DRR:** One key goal of BRUP was to transform the role of women from being the worst victims of disasters to becoming effective disaster managers and a force for resilience. This goal is being achieved through increased female participation in DRR activities (as UCVs, part of the design of RRAPs, members of the WDMC). The EKATA members and female UCVs we met felt more at ease with participating in community life, for example in taking the floor during CDC meetings, moving around the community and even taking the lead in some rescue activities. Their actions have been visible for different audiences (family, community, institutions and even broader public through TV broadcasting during the Tampaco fire).

“Before I was just an anonymous girl in the community. Now people know I can help others; people know me and I am seen differently” (Female UCV, Tongi)

- **(++) Access to formal banking system:** As per SG2, 300 of the most vulnerable women were specifically targeted by the project. As part of the livelihood support they received (small, unconditional cash grants), BRUP worked on linking them with the formal banking sector by helping with banking procedures, free of charge account openings, and simplifying banking formalities. This **extra project feature** was found to be particularly successful and long lasting, in terms of facilitating household savings, but over and above this as a means of also encouraging for women empowerment.

“Before it was not even imaginable to go to the bank. The field facilitator has helped us with the process of opening the account and now we can handle it on our own” (EKATA member, Tongi)

- **(-) Resilient livelihoods opportunities for most vulnerable women was perhaps the weaker point of effectiveness from the project.** The livelihood component of SG2 was only very lightly touched upon. The final use of the unconditional cash grant provided (7,000 Taka) to the 300 most vulnerable women was unclear. The BRUP team suggested that cash support could have been made more impactful by linking conditional cash support to incentive skills training (sewing, tailoring, etc.) in order to create more sustainable livelihoods. Informal group discussions and risk awareness through EKATA groups is not sufficient for improving livelihoods; women’s empowerment also requires economic and financial empowerment. Various life and business skills training and coaching sessions (including functional and financial literacy), coupled with support to access local markets, will contribute to more substantial and sustained vulnerability reduction.

SG 3: Enhanced institutional capacity to provide resilience-building services

The targeted institutions (GCC officials and FSCD representatives) were engaged from the very beginning and welcomed the project and its approach of strengthening the existing mechanisms in place. Some key components were a real success:

- **(+) Linkages between communities and ward authorities:** Strong ties between the CDCs and WDMCs have arisen, as CDC members have participated in WDMC quarterly meetings and vice versa.
- **(+) Relationship building strategy, integrated from the outset:** The project team engaged the GCC at the start of the project, to favour buy-in and ownership of the project by the CEO. The team focused on strategic relationship and capacity building with appointed government representatives (secretary at ward level, GCC official) who are less exposed to staff turnover and political reshuffling than elected bodies.

(++) Achievements Beyond Project Boundaries

A real strength of the project was its capacity to leverage the example of good practices produced by the project at community and ward level. The BRUP model was set up as an example for the GCC, which took on some of the best initiatives and replicated the model in other Wards, scaling-up the coverage.

(++) BRUP model replication at GCC level: Initially, BRUP helped to form functioning WDMC in two wards (12 and 55). City Corporation acknowledged **BRUP formed WDMCs as a model to be replicated in other wards**. They decided to form WDMC in all 57 wards and sought CARE Bangladesh's technical support to assist them in this regard. Thanks to longstanding lobbying work, to which CARE contributed significantly, Ward DMCs (WDMCs) were recently approved as part of the SoDs (Standing Order on Disasters).

(+) Advocacy successes; national and international visibility: The BRUP project is a strategic **flagship project** for CARE, willing to position itself as a key player in the emerging field of urban resilience. The BRUP project has been highly visible on the national and international agenda (Urban INGOs Forum, Urban Dialogue, 10th International Conference on Community Based-Adaptation (CBA), etc.) and won several prizes, which triggered additional funding to scale up some activities.

(+) The strong learning and knowledge management component of the project was a key strength in that matter, as it enabled a continuous learning loop within the team. The team could capitalise on findings and lessons learned, particularly to produce communication materials for visibility and national and international level advocacy purposes. **Project lessons and material have already been shared** with other CARE country offices, with high probability for scale up and replication within the CARE network in other urban vulnerable areas (ongoing proposal development for CARE Indonesia). This is why any programmatic recommendations are valuable for the CARE team, as there is a strong appetite to validate and replicate this model.

Enablers for effectiveness: in-built flexibility and internal support

The BRUP team benefited from some valuable **internal organisational support**, hierarchy backup and critical flexibility, which enabled the project team to fine-tune the activities based on arising challenges and on-the-go findings. **Flexibility** in the design, enabled by the donor, was a critical aspect for project adaptation and improvements, favouring change, innovation and reactivity along the course of the project. This is something which is fairly unusual in the common donor-based rigid programming picture. The project could maintain relevance thanks to the in-built flexibility of the project, which enabled the team to change some project activities when they were found to no longer be effective, or to develop and test new initiatives which were not included in the logframe. An example of this was working with the GCC CEO to scale-up the garbage system to include an additional 17 communities that weren't included in the initial project logframe.

(++) Unexpected Outcomes: Social Bonding is Key for Resilience

Social cohesion and social capital in the form of community organisations and support networks is weaker in urban communities than in rural areas. Slum dwellers often migrate from one slum to another and are temporary residents; this transience results in little sense of belonging to the community. People are engaged in various work scattered throughout urban areas and have little free time. Due to a scarcity of open space, there are no community gathering facilities, which increases the difficulty of developing a 'sense of community'.

Social cohesion was a key unexpected outcome of the project, though found to be highly relevant when it comes to urban resilience. CARE observed that community mobilization activities increased cohesion and connectedness amongst community members, an indirect benefit of project activities. The benefit of social cohesion for resilience was observed when a fire broke out at Tetultala slum, Tongi, where the residents of Uttar Tetultola slum worked together and volunteered to help each other, a wonderful sign of trust and support.

Key Challenges to Effectiveness in Project Implementation

The BRUP team faced many implementation challenges along the course of the project. Among them, two were particularly significant and provide some lessons learned for similar project in the future.

Intervening on private land vs. Kashland

There were challenges working with households on privately owned land, due to privacy and conflict of interest concerns with the landlords. CARE Bangladesh realised that providing infrastructure and hardware support, such as water tanks, had a potential cascading negative impact for beneficiaries, especially on rent increases. It was decided not to implement any hardware activities (water supply systems, drainers, dumping places) in the two private land communities, apart from solar street lights. The effectiveness of the project was therefore compromised on private land, and was less effective here compared with communities on Kash land. In order to compensate, the project tried to implement more 'soft' activities in the private slums.

Political challenges

The project had to deal with political issues at the GCC level, which delayed and hampered the start of activities. The elected mayor (from the opposition party), the key decision maker of the GCC, was actually in jail for most of the time of his mandate. In the absence of an elected mayor, formation of the CCDMC took longer than expected and mobilizing the CCDMC remained a challenge.

Engaging the elected representatives at ward level was also a challenge, and depended highly on the personality and availability of the ward councillors. The success of this project unfortunately relied heavily on political willingness and the internal politics of the GCC. The

team underlined as a key challenge the of lack of coordination between different government bodies (District/GCC).

Despite this, the project did very well in finding some alternative strategies to engage the GCC by reaching out to the next layer of governance authority – namely the chief executive officer and secretary – to carry on with project activities where possible, with the acting mayor’s approval.

4.3 Sustainability

Overall rating: <i>Poor to Adequate</i>

(+) Sustainability Features Incorporated into the Project Design

Sustainability was built into the ToC by working with different layers of governance (community, ward, GCC, national), and by using a capacity-building and facilitation approach. The BRUP approach focused on strengthening and capacitating the systems that were already in place while adding new institutional features aimed at ensuring continuity of the improvements and sustainability of the resilience.

“Care is putting agencies in contact, but is not doing the work for them” (BRUP member)

For example, the UCVs programme which the BRUP project strengthened is a national government priority and the FSCD is tasked with developing UCVs as part of a national programme. The WDMC model is an output of the project, aimed at becoming the institutional local response to DRR in urban settings which has already been endorsed both at GCC and national levels.

(+) Activities and Project’s Gains likely to be Sustained

Despite the relatively short time span, some project interventions are already clearly sustainable:

- At the household or personal level, knowledge and risk awareness has been seeded, *“and this is lifelong”* (EKATA member) according to community respondents. Though, it seems that risk awareness has mostly focused on fire risk.
- All gains in terms of women’s empowerment are likely to be sustained as it is a combination of self-awareness of their role and possibilities in the family, the community, etc. and awareness on other social issues such as early marriage, child labour, health and hygiene issues etc.
- **At community level, what is likely to continue is what is the most directly beneficial for the communities.** Some “hardware support” provided (e.g. water tank, vans for garbage collection, latrines, drains, solar lamps, etc.) are very likely to

be sustained, at least in the medium term, as communities have taken on the management of these structures and their maintenance through the creation of CDC committees and the financial contribution of community members. The main reason for the initiative's success was the BRUP's insistence on making community organisations the primary players of the activities, using the **community-based management system model**: the communities identified the issue, and then developed a financial plan to sustain the activity. All the interventions have been implemented using a **co-financing mechanism** where community contribution was between 5 and 26%, thus creating strong ownership of these features. Major interventions prioritized and implemented are: street solar lights, staircases and footpaths; drainage renovation; safe water supply systems, garbage management and hygienic toilets.

- **At the institutional level, some of the gains are likely to be sustainable as embedded in local structures:**
 - City Corporation Disaster Management Committee (CCDMC) is now activated and functioning;
 - Replication of the WDMC model: GCC decided to form WDMC in all of its 57 wards;
 - Ward DMCs (WDMCs) were recently approved as part of the national SODs (Standing Order on Disasters);
 - Scale-up of the garbage management system in another 17 communities;
 - Real willingness from the GCC to carry on such initiatives.

(-) Activities and Project's Gains Unlikely to Be Sustained

- Many activities' successes and continuation rely on key project components ending after the project's lifetime. Indeed, **no community financial contribution has been planned by the project for the viability of the Information Hub**, the key structure and safe space that allows community gatherings, meetings and service provision. When the evaluators visited the communities, the information hubs were already closed. The Information Hub turned out to be a crucial element for the implementation of many project activities, especially in places where space is a major constraint (like Tongi). This is why regular meetings of the community groups (EKATA, CF and CDC) might be sustained informally but will most likely suffer from the lack of available space.
- No identified leaders in-community to take-over the role of facilitator: **the field facilitator role was crucial** when it comes to community gathering.

"The field facilitator was really good and if he goes away we don't know how we are going to continue this. We have learned a lot from him" (CDC member Baimail)

Without an identified leader within each community group, as well as the necessary support (financial support for phone credit for example) to take over the role of the facilitator, the community groups' activities are not likely to continue.

This is particularly relevant for the UCVs. No matter how motivated they are, UCVs

should keep practicing what they have learnt. This depends highly on the FSCD, and on the way they will link with UCV leaders in the community.

“The FCSD should continue working with us so that we don’t forgot what we’ve learnt. If we stop here everything will be useless” (female UCV Tongi)

What has been built with the FSCD, which was one of the most effective activities with more than 600 UCVs trained and mobilised by the project, will most likely not be sustained as the MoU between CARE and the FSCD is coming to an end in December 2018. Moreover, **no actual plan nor resources have been set up to frame the future relations between the relevant FSCD fire stations and the community volunteers**. No focal points were appointed in the UCV groups and no further support will be provided in terms of refresher courses (important for motivation) or financial support for communication.

“Fire brigades are technologically and financially handicapped” (GCC representative)

- If one MoU was signed with the FSCD (which actually triggered many successful achievements beyond project boundaries, and created a real ownership from the FSCD focal points), no formal agreement existed with the GCC, which might have a negative impact on the sustainability of the gains achieved at the institutional level.

The Current Challenges to Sustainability and Scale-up

Lack of public financial resources available and resources allocation

At the institutional level, the factors that impede sustainability mostly lie with the lack of **financial resources at ward and GCC level** (or more precisely, with the difficulty in getting resources allocated for DRR in such areas) **and the dependence on international INGOs**: the institutional respondents were unanimous in saying they *“want the project to continue”*. As per the GCC or the FCSD, they don’t have the capacity (financial and even technical) to sustain similar initiatives without external support and they are heavily reliant on the support of the NGOs (which tends to be a vicious cycle that means the authorities don’t take on responsibility).

“The national plan to train 62,000 UCVs is dependent on international support for funding” (FSCD national headquarter representative)

Political will

The lack of political will at GCC and national level, and entrenched poor governance are difficult barriers to overcome the financial resource scarcity issue. Beyond awareness and goodwill commitment, key political decisions (on resource allocations, for instance) are still lacking to ensure continuity of the project gains. The **lack of engagement and leadership**

from elected bodies, especially at ward level (key decision makers when it comes to resources allocations), was the most challenging part of the project, though the most critical one when it comes to sustainability. Their engagement is tied up with political game playing and election opportunities/agendas. The success of this type of project depends on the take-up from elected representatives (at ward and GCC level), which are actually the most difficult actors to engage with at city level.

“I am a bit worried about sustainability because some of the work just started last month. And we need the support from the ward councillors. We cannot do anything without the council. And they are not willing to increase taxes because of the risk of losing voters. This is why the GCC is in a dire situation” (GCC representative)

Turnover of staff and representatives

The success of the project rests on the strong personal relationships formed during a period of 3 years between the BRUP team and the GCC. **Turnover of staff will jeopardize the sustainability of the activities as no formal agreements exist between the organisations:** *“I’m not sure this committee will sustain after CARE BRUP team’s departure” (GCC representative)*. This turnover issue applies both at GCC level, where at least 2 of the 3 key representatives will be taking up other opportunities, and within CARE, where most of the project staff are moving to other NGOs. This will jeopardize the gains both in terms of contacts and ties with local institutions but also knowledge and capitalisation of the project history.

(--) The absence of a proper exit strategy

The lack of an exit strategy, defined from the outset of the project, raises key sustainability concerns. Being dependant on donor willingness to continue the engagement in Gazipur, the project should have defined its exit strategy, ensuring sustainability to allow community or institutional takeover of key sustainability elements (information centres, UCV follow-up, community field facilitation, etc.)

“We couldn't wrap up everything before the project ended. And we have not organised what's next” (CDC members, Konabari)

4.4 Efficiency

Overall rating: Poor to Adequate

The evaluation team believes that overall, efficiency is one of the weaker points of the BRUP project. It is quite a costly intervention, given the type of activities engaged in, coverage, allocation of tasks between the implementing partner and CARE Bangladesh, and the number of beneficiaries reached. The total budget for this project was €1 400 000. The endline evaluation study conducted by DevResonance also underline financial resource utilization of the project as a main concern for efficiency.

(+) Replication at No-cost

By the end of the project, all activities were implemented in accordance with the logical framework of the project and its objectives in terms of number of beneficiaries and intervention indicators.

On one hand, the **project can be considered “efficient” as some project features were replicated at no cost**, as a result of advocacy.

“We have undertaken many non-costly activities: we brought all representatives from the 57 wards together and provided a one day risk analysis training. Each of the 57 wards will develop their RRAPs and submit to the GCC, which will enable to channel funding from the GCC to the wards to fund identified DRR activities at community-level” (BRUP team member)

(+/-) The Cost of a Pilot Approach

BRUP is a learning project, which explains why a significant part of the budget was allocated to M&E, learning and knowledge management purpose. This further explains the high costs related to the development of training modules, the adaptation of CBA tools, communication outputs and materials, etc. However, if the project was to be replicated, these costs should certainly be reduced in the next budget design.

“All the guides, learning and communication documents are already done. More manpower can be put towards the implementation of the project. And maybe add another strategic goal” (BRUP team member)

(-- The Use of Resources: Hardware vs. 'Soft' Activities

Most of the project funding went towards salaries for project management, M&E, communication, supporting community mobilisation, the capacity-building of community groups, development of training modules, advocacy activities towards institutions (e.g. software activities, which required only HR), **but actually relatively little for the activities that the communities had identified and planned** (hardware activities, livelihood support, etc.). This is a weak point of the budget design. As said earlier, community-led water and garbage systems were particularly cheap in terms of input (a water tank is less than \$1,000) though particularly impactful and sustainable for the communities. On average, approximately 5% of the total budget went for hardware activities in communities.

The balance of community contribution, participation, and benefit at the level of physical inputs varied a lot between the different communities, mostly between public and private land. As highlighted earlier, communities based on private land didn't receive any hardware except solar street lights.

In addition, the evaluation team believes that some project-related costs were particularly high: furniture, fixtures and equipment, overheads, rental and various expenses.

(-) Roles and Responsibilities: Allocation between CARE and VERC

In year one, CARE recruited nine full-time staff and one part-time position. VERC also recruited all relevant staff – a team of thirteen. CARE's primary role included overall project management, project design, monitoring and evaluation, technical support and oversight, partner capacity building, donor reporting, financial management, audit and compliance.

VERC was to be broadly responsible for overall project implementation, community selection and mobilization, regular/routine monitoring, stakeholder mobilization, and progress reporting.

"What about the roles and responsibilities allocation between CARE and VERC? We are doing the same, it is one and only team" (BRUP team)

The human and financial allocation of resources between CARE and VERC were not always clear nor adequate for the outcomes envisaged. The evaluators noted in the budget design a clear duplication of positions between CARE and VERC, which actually led to an inflated budget (two M&E positions, two finance positions, two communication officers).

(-) VERC Partner Capacity Building

Village Education Resource Center (VERC) is a long-standing partner of CARE Bangladesh. The organisation was already very competent, having worked with many international NGOs for more than 40 years. VERC currently has 38 area offices with more than 2,000 employees

and maintains both an urban and rural focus, implementing a range of health, water, and sanitation projects. The organization has extensive experience in community mobilization and development, and has worked closely with local government to strengthen service delivery platforms.

The added-value of CARE was identified in:

- It's very good financial reporting system (every month VERC submit financial reports and it goes to the audit department);
- M&E support provided to VERC when it comes to project reporting and the preparation of monitoring tools.
- Advocacy and relationship building with officials, with the leverage of CARE status and credibility. CARE staff were in charge of coordination and institutional engagement.

This project was a learning and capacity building opportunity for both organisations as none of them had prior experience working on DRR and resilience in urban areas.

“VERC had DRR experience before the project but in rural areas, or semi-urban. For example, the mock drill activities conducted with the FSCD in an open factory was a first time for us” (VERC partner)

(-) CARE project integration and synergies in Gazipur for increased efficiency

Despite implementing several projects in the GCC, **there is poor integration between the different projects based there**. CARE Bangladesh has no specific geographical intervention strategy for Gazipur⁶, and the absence of a formal urban intervention framework for working in Gazipur results in poor collaboration and a lack of strategic/programmatic linkages between the teams and projects. This is despite the fact that some share the same objectives with sometimes similar components (e.g OIKKO project), and even some of the same intervention areas. The staff tried to build some ad hoc synergies between projects (health services, for example) but a more formalised programmatic/geographical coordination could optimise the different Gazipur-based projects' resources and increase the impact on beneficiaries and project efficiency. A better integrated geographic approach could allow to share common support functions (Finance, M&E, communication etc.) between the different projects and thus reduce costs.

⁶ There is only an Urban Impact statement, 2012

4.5 Likelihood of Impact

Overall rating: No rating

“This project is an infant compared to others. We have projects that have been running for more than 9 years. But we created an example with this one” (CARE Bangladesh top management staff)

Impact is not something that can be measured in such a short-term period. Resilience is a complex concept, touching on multiple aspects of DRR, development and governance. Resilience refers to a person or system’s capacities (be it financial, human, social, natural or physical) to deal with shocks and stresses, manage risks, and transform their lives in response to new hazards and opportunities. This is why resilience programming requires an integrated and collaborative approach targeting the multiple layers of vulnerability, and cannot address risk in isolation.

To assess the BRUP project performance, at output level it is quite straightforward, but assessing the impact (at outcome level, e.g. SG1 “building resilience of communities”) **is much more complex** (statement from DevResonance). The purpose of the final endline evaluation was to assess project performance regarding outcomes, comparing baseline socio-economic data with endline data. **The building of resilience is not easy to measure, and encompasses a multitude of features. Impact measurement would require a strong M&E system with components and metrics for resilience, agreed at the very beginning of the project design.** This is why in this evaluation report we are not addressing “impact” on resilience but “likelihood of impact”, based on the qualitative feedback and observations we could gather during our field trip, in a very short period of time.

“Activities were small but impact was huge” (BRUP team member).

Some structural changes are assumed to have a likelihood of impact:

- **Increased access to safe water:** the likelihood of impact of the “water collective” system is quite good. The project (by providing sustainable community-managed safe water at a cheaper price than the private well-established service provider) altered the monopoly system of private service providers and the situation has changed. Monthly water costs for collective members reduced from \$5 to just 60 cents. The model is even improving the lives of slum dwellers who are not collective members since in order to stay competitive, local water traders have cut their prices in half. The cascading positive impact of safe water in these communities has led to a reduction in water-borne diseases among children, increased community resilience against fire and has put an end to harassment whilst collecting water.

But other underlying factors of vulnerability remain:

- **Structural factors of vulnerability remain, such as poverty-driven risky behaviours:** for example, cooking is done in small household ovens. Firewood is

prohibitively expensive for most households and some women burn jute scraps or plastic bags for fuel to cook – a highly dangerous and unhealthy practice.

- **A lack of tenure security impedes resilience building: The main threat for community respondents on government land is the risk of eviction, and it is actually one of the main impediments to plan any investments** and generally to plan for the future in the community. *“We live on Kash land, and the risk of eviction is permanent. Our first need is to get tenure security”* (EKATA members). Although the project made some attempt to advocate for pro-poor policies with the government, for better housing or other critical facilities, much more still needs to be done.

The main likelihood of impact of the project is probably to be found in its **trigger role for awareness and programming in urban resilience issues in Bangladesh**. As already stated earlier in the report, this pilot is initiating changes in the mentalities at different levels, beneficiaries themselves, communities, local government and governance bodies and proving that they are able to work together in a challenging urban environment, but also in the development community (inside the CARE family, among the local NGO scene, within donors and even further). This change path is most likely to create effects in the perception and approaches to this issue and is, for the evaluator team, one of the biggest project successes.

5. Recommendations

Below are compiled some recommendations, addressing a strategic level, programmatic level and project/activities level. Strategic recommendations are aimed at C&A Foundation to enhance and refine the intervention strategy and create systemic change on the issue of urban resilience building. Programmatic and project level recommendations are aimed mostly at CARE Bangladesh to address the weaknesses of the project and propose adjustments for potential replication.

Strategic Recommendations for C&A Foundation:

C&A Foundation should:

1. **Sustain and scale-up the effort to build an urban resilience strategy and response in Bangladesh, while maintaining the focus on Gazipur City Corporation, to capitalise on and sustain project gains but also because of its strategic role in Bangladesh's economy** (visibility, private sector resources, GoB attention). GCC possesses the right criteria (scale of needs, stakeholders, strong private sector role, etc.) to be the right place for a pilot scale-up at city corporation level. To sustain key stakeholders' buy-in (GoB, GCC), a larger scale intervention should be undertaken through private sector involvement and strong local authority support, in order to build evidence for future advocacy and demonstrate the possibilities of such actions.
2. **Engage the local, and booming, private sector in terms of resources, interests and expertise** to co-design or co-fund any similar future interventions in partnership. As developing cooperative agreements with the private sector takes a long time, C&A Foundation should support longer term initiatives in urban areas (min five years). It is worth having a long inception period for future projects/programmes in order to discuss and understand the private sectors' interests in urban resilience. Sustainability and maintenance of project gains depends on the availability of continuous local support. Any urban resilience programme should be a 'city programme' involving from the very beginning all stakeholders, while taking into account their internal interests/agendas. The private sector can also be a driving force to ensure continuous political and authorities' support and resource allocation.
3. **Pursue the evidence-based learning and dissemination exercise initiated by the BRUP pilot project** by giving future programmes the right knowledge management components and visibility, in order to sustain or enhance interest from other stakeholders (policy makers, authorities NGOs, donors). In the future, research and baseline assessments of such projects should concentrate on understanding the drivers and inhibitors to private sector participation.

Programmatic Recommendations for CARE Bangladesh

CARE Bangladesh should:

1. **Define a more comprehensive approach to vulnerability and risk reduction** for urban settings. Urban dwellers face compound risks (physical risks, health and nutrition risks, financial risks, climate risks etc), at household level but also at workplaces. Such a response should not be designed as a silo or thematic project but rather be embedded/mainstreamed in a more comprehensive urban programme including other aspects of resilience and vulnerabilities (rights, land tenure, women's empowerment, health, nutrition, access to insurance and banking systems, etc.). Engaging all relevant stakeholders, including local garments factories to improve work conditions and work safety should be made a strategic goal in any future logframe aiming at building urban resilience.
2. **Build synergies and better inter-link CARE Bangladesh's projects in a defined geographic zone** (geographic/urban focus). Despite implementing several projects in the GCC area, there is poor integration and synergies between the different CARE projects in Gazipur City Corporation. A more formalised 'geographical focus' intervention framework could optimise the different Gazipur-based projects' resources and allow the mutualisation of support between the projects and thus reduce costs and enhance efficiency.
3. **Set up a formal NGOs coordination platform in Gazipur.** CARE Bangladesh is already leading an informal coordination platform between NGOs intervening in GCC. The evaluators recommend that such a mechanism should be institutionalized at GCC level to better empower authorities and ensure better sustainability of projects.
4. **Better differentiate the roles of CARE Bangladesh and the implementing partner VERC, based on the added value of each.** Avoid duplication of roles and positions to reduce costs and enhance efficiency. Indeed, CARE Bangladesh should focus and concentrate on political relations, advocacy and organising the involvement of the external stakeholders (private sector and authorities) while VERC should take care of the delivery of community activities with more autonomy, based on tools and models already available.
5. **CARE Bangladesh should rethink and tailor its intervention strategy according to the land tenure aspect of the area of intervention.** BRUP activities' effectiveness has seen different levels of achievement depending on the tenure settings (private land/Kashland). For a similar project in the future, CARE Bangladesh should adapt its intervention and engagement strategy particularly on private land, where slum upgrading activities have been particularly challenging.

6. **Consider entrepreneurship from community members as a possible solution for basic last mile service delivery in urban settings** (water, waste management, safe electricity provision, micro insurance, etc.)
7. **Formalise partnerships with relevant authorities or partners, by signing MoUs** to ensure ownership and sustainability while empowering institutions and making them responsible for their role in decision making and resource allocations.
8. **Support and strengthen the linkages between the different layers of governance, including between the Ministries (DDM), the GCC and Ward elected bodies**, by involving them in coordination and piloting phases of any projects. Mobilizing and engaging the different levels is a first step, organising their interactions should be the next focus.
9. **Ensure a comprehensive mechanism to counterbalance the exclusion bias risk** of community-based targeting.

Project Level Recommendations for CARE Bangladesh and BRUP team

CARE Bangladesh and BRUP team should:

1. **Do more on linking the targeted communities with key service providers in the area** (particularly health service providers). For example, health risk was a major issue raised by the different communities, especially women. The project tried to link with other NGOs such as Marie Stopes, but this could have been made a systematic objective and a regular activity in community.
2. **Ensure the information hubs can remain open after the end of the project.** Sustainability can be ensured when there is community ownership over the input, incentivised via financial community contribution and a financial system in place for maintenance, as well as the support of local authorities.
3. **Consider a larger envelope for hardware investment at the community level** (for relatively small investment, large effects on the communities' well-being and overall resilience can be produced). Some hardware activities like drainage, necessitate more technical support in-community.
4. **Cash transfer should be accompanied with specific business trainings or other market linked skills** (sewing, tailoring) based on needs, as well as always linked with the formal banking sector.
5. **Ensure safety at workplaces is included in the community risk mapping** and in subsequent activities.

6. SWOT Analysis of the BRUP Project

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relied on vocal leaders in community - Learning and knowledge management component - In-Built flexibility - Strong implementing partner for community outreach (VERC) - Internal organisation support - Relationship building and networking strategy - Replicable model - CARE Bangladesh's reputation and credibility - Visibility of the organisation and strong communication component - Leadership and coordination capacity in GCC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No previous experience of the team in DRR in urban environments - No existing tools and guidance on community mobilization at urban level - No real exit strategy - High budget for low coverage - 3 years is a short timeframe to work with institutions - Institutional work highly dependent on ward councillor availability and appetite - No urban approach or geographical approach of CARE Bangladesh for the GCC (donor-based approach)
Opportunities	Risks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CEO of GCC remains in position - The most motivated ward councillor is re-elected - Scale-up of the project in more wards - Increasing contacts with private sector - Urban agenda pushing for more DRR activities in GCC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Election in 5 months causes power shifts - Lack of political willingness - People moving back to rural areas - Staff turnover effects the relationship building with authorities - No mayor in place (decision making power at GCC level)

7. Annexes

Annex 1: Evaluation Matrix

Annex 2: Data Procurement Plan and Sources

Annex 3: Example of FGD Topic Guide

Annex 4: C&A Foundation Ranking Scale

Annex 5: Photos of Tongi and Konabari



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